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CHOICE OF LAW IN MICHIGAN: A TIME TO
GO MODERN
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER-
To everything there is a season, and a time to every
purpose under the heaven
A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep,
and a time to cast away.'
I. INTRODUCTION: A TIME To KEEP
It is unfortunate that the first case to present squarely the
question of whether Michigan should abandon its traditional
approach to choice of law was A bendschein v. Farrell,2 decid-
ed in 1969. Abendschein was a seemingly complex case, as
conflicts cases go; the accident victim was a resident of New
York, the defendant was a resident of Michigan, and the acci-
dent occurred in Ontario. Moreover, New York had no guest
statute and the guest statutes of Michigan and Ontario dif-
fered. The Michigan guest statute,3 which has since been
declared unconstitutional, 4 barred recovery by a guest
passenger against the host driver unless gross negligence or
wilful and wanton misconduct could be shown, while the On-
tario guest statute in force at the time of the accident 5 barred
recovery completely. In A bendschein, however, since the com-
plaint alleged that the driver was intoxicated, recovery would
have been allowed under the Michigan guest statute as well as
under New York law. The case was further complicated by the
fact that the accident occurred on a trip from Buffalo, New
tProfessor of Law, Wayne State University; B.A. 1956, J.D. 1959, University
of Pittsburgh.
1. Ecclesiastes 3:1, 8.
2. 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
5. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.401 (1977).
4. Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d
636 (1975).
5. The statute was amended, effective Jan. 1, 1967, to allow recovery for
gross negligence. ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960), as amended by, ONT.
REv. STAT. ch. 64, § 20(2) (1964).
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York, to Detroit, Michigan-between which the most direct
route led across Ontario6- and that the plaintiff encouraged
the court to adopt the "dominant contacts" approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Under that ap-
proach the choice of law decision turns on the factual contacts
that the transaction had with the involved states. 7 Given the
particular factual situation A bendschein presented, however,
it was not at all clear which state had the "dominant contacts"
on the issue of host-guest immunity. The case might have ap-
peared less complex to the court and the solution more ap-
parent if the plaintiff had urged the adoption of what may be
referred to as the policy-centered approach to choice of law,
under which the choice of law decision is based on considera-
tions of policy and fairness to the parties.8 Forced to confront
all of these factors, however, the Michigan supreme court was
not persuaded that the time had come to abandon the tradi-
tional approach, since, as it observed, "the quagmire of
unanswered and perceivably unanswerable questions arising
out of the proposed new doctrine appears less attractive than
our admittedly hard and fast-and occasionally unjust, it is
true-rule that the law of the place of the wrong is applied
when the forum is a Michigan court."9
A different result might have obtained if the case had
presented the same factual situation and the same fact-law
pattern 0 as was presented in an earlier case, Kaiser v. North, "
6. When I was doing the preliminary research for this article, I was
residing in Ithaca, New York, and had accepted an appointment at Wayne State,
beginning in the fall of 1977. I knew that I would be making at least two trips to
Detroit, one of them with my family, and would be taking the Ontario route.
Reading Abendschein and the other cases involving accidents along that route was
not exactly reassuring.
7. The reference to "dominant contacts" is, of course, to the RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS' concept of the state of the most significant
relationship. As to the approach of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), see generally
Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
689 (1963).
8. As to the meaning of the policy-centered approach to choice of law, see
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 KY. L.J. 27, 57-61 (1967).
9. 382 Mich. at 516, 170 N.W.2d at 139. For a criticism of the reasons
that the court advanced, see Shuman, Conflict of Laws, 1969 Ann. Survey of Mich.
Law, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 535, 554 (1970). Professor Shuman states: "It is hard to
conceive of a more circular, amphibolic, elenctic, and fatuous statement to support
retention of the lex loci rule." Id.
10. As to the fact-law pattern in conflicts torts cases, see notes 106-08 &
accompanying text infra.
11. 292 Mich. 49, 289 N.W. 325 (1939).
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decided in 1939. That case firmly established the place of the
wrong rule of the traditional approach as the law in
Michigan. There the guest passenger and the host driver were
both residents of Michigan, where the trip originated, and
presumably where the parties were to return at the trip's con-
clusion, but the accident occurred in Ontario. The plaintiff
alleged gross negligence, which would have entitled him to
recovery under Michigan law, and the defendent asserted the
Ontario guest statute as a complete bar to the suit. The court
held, as did all other courts at that time, that the law of the
place where the accident occurred governed, and, consequent-
ly, applied Ontario law to deny recovery. In virtually all of the
cases where this same fact pattern was presented-two forum
residents involved in an accident in another state, the law of
which differed from the law of the forum on the point in
issue-a clear majority of courts' 2 in recent years have chosen
to abandon the place of the wrong rule and with it the tradi-
tional approach to choice of law.' 3
The kind of situation described above reveals most starkly
the unsoundness of the place of the wrong rule. If the law of
the forum allows recovery, the case presents a false conflict in
terms of interest analysis.14 For example, the forum has a real
interest in applying its law to allow recovery, since the social
and economic consequences of the accident will be felt by the
victim in that state, while the state of injury has no interest in
applying its law to deny recovery, since the consequences of
imposing liability on the defendant and the insurer will not be
felt in that state.' 5 Conversely, if the law of the forum does
not allow recovery, it likewise has a real interest in applying its
law to protect its resident defendant and insurer, and is not
disposed toward subordinating that interest to any possible in-
terest of the state of injury in allowing recovery to a non-
resident plaintiff injured in that state. 16 The uniform practice
12. Among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the breakdown is as
follows: abandoned the place of the wrong rule-27; adhered to the place of the
wrong rule-18; have not yet passed on the question-6. See the discussion and
listing of cases in Sedler, Rules of Choice-of-Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules:
Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975 n.2 (1977).
13. Beginning, of course, with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
14. For a discussion of the interest analysis approach, see generally Sedler,
The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Refor-
mulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 186-88 (1977).
15. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 186-87.
16. See id.
1978]
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of the courts that have abandoned the traditional approach
when presented with this situation is reflected in what can be
termed a rule of choice of law: 17 when two residents of the
forum are involved in an accident in another state, the law of
the forum applies. 18 Thus, if a modem version of Kaiser v.
North had been presented to the Michigan supreme court in
1969 instead of Abendschein v. Farrell, Michigan too might
have chosen to go modem by abandoning the traditional ap-
proach to choice of law. Michigan, however, chose to stay
with the decreasing number of American courts that cling to
the traditional approach.' 9
The Michigan supreme court has not decided any cases
directly involving choice of law since A bendschein, but much
has happened in Michigan and elsewhere since that case was
decided. These developments should persuade the Michigan
supreme court to abandon the place of the wrong rule and the
traditional approach to choice of law that it embodies. It is
now time for Michigan to embrace the policy-centered ap-
proach to choice of law, with its emphasis on considerations of
policy and fairness to the parties and on the real interests of
the involved states. Accordingly, this article will first discuss
the experience of the courts that have abandoned the place of
the wrong rule and have applied a policy-centered approach
to choice of law. It will then discuss choice of law in Michigan
and how the place of the wrong rule has been applied-or
misapplied-in practice under the strictures of A bendschein,
as well as the way in which choice of law would have operated
in Michigan in the years following A bendschein if the court
had adopted the policy-centered approach. It will conclude
with a discussion of the constitutional question that is raised
by continued adherence to the place of the wrong rule in
Michigan.
II. THE EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE: THE OPERATION OF THE
POLICY-CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
Some have said that in regard to choice of law, "there ex-
ists extreme disagreement among both judges and commen-
17. See generally Sedler, supra note 12.
18. Id. 1033.
19. Massachusetts is the latest state to abandon the traditional approach.
Pevoski v. Pevoski, - Mass. - , 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976).
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tators not simply over the details of choice of law policy, but
over the most fundamental principles of the subject." 20 While
academic commentators have long agreed that the traditional
approach should be abandoned, they have sharply disagreed
over what approach should be adopted in its stead. The same
disagreement was reflected in judicial decisions when A bend-
schein was decided. As in A bendschein, lawyers arguing for
the abandonment of the traditional approach tended to urge
replacement by the "state of the most significant relationship"
approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws;
this approach had been explicitly adopted by a number of
courts at that time. 2' The most influential academic ap-
proach, however, appeared to be Currie's interest analysis,
which based the choice of law decision on the policies
reflected in the laws of the involved states and the interest of
each state, in light of those policies, in having its law applied
on the point in issue. 22 Some courts expressly followed Currie's
approach; 23  some followed Leflar's approach of choice-
influencing considerations. 24 Some were more eclectic, looking
to different approaches which would support the particular
result they desired to reach. 25 All in all, the concern over the
"quagmire of unanswered and perceivably unanswerable ques-
tions" that the Michigan supreme court expressed in A bend-
shein was not wholly unrealistic, and was shared by other
20. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (2d ed.
1975).
21. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968);
Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Mitchell v. Craft, 211
So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Casey v. Manson Constr. Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898
(1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
22. Currie's major articles have been collected in a book, B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
23. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 68 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1967); Melk v. Sarahson, 49 NJ. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Tooker v. Lopez,
24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). New York's adherence
to interest analysis was sharply curtailed in favor of "narrow, policy-based rules" in
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 305 (1966); Wood-
ward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968);
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). As to Leflar's ap-
proach see generally Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966); Conflicts Laws: More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Baits v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
1978]
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courts that likewise refused to abandon the traditional ap-
proach.2
6
Today, however, while the debate among academicians
over the preferred approach to choice of law remains
unabated,27 the same generally is not true with respect to the
courts.2 8 They have resolved the choice of law questions in the
cases that have arisen on the basis of considerations of policy
and fairness to the parties and with reference to the fact-law
pattern presented in each particular case. 29 In practice,
regardless of the specific approach or methodology that the
courts purportedly apply, they have emphasized the policies
and interests of the involved states,30 and have applied their
own law whenever they have seen a real interest in doing so,
so long as this would not be fundamentally unfair to the other
party.31
The practice of the courts in torts cases can be related to
the development of rules of choice of law. 32 These rules of
choice of law are based on the results reached by the courts in
the cases coming before them without regard to the specific
approach or methodology that they purportedly applied. 33
The most "universal" rule, followed by all of the courts that
have abandoned the traditional approach, is that when two
residents of the forum are involved in an accident in another
state, the law of the forum applies.3 4 Another rule of choice of
26. See, Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 493, 211 A.2d 594, 597 (1965);
Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 749-52 (Fla. 1967); Winters
v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tenn. 1972).
27. It is difficult to categorize the conflicting approaches. The adherents of
interest analysis disagree among themselves over Currie's insistence that the forum
should always apply its own law whenever it has a real interest in doing so. Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations must be seen as another approach, as, of course,
must the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). Among some commentators there has been
renewed emphasis on territorialism, removed, however, from the territorially-based
rules of the traditional approach. There has also been some movement in the direc-
tion of narrow, policy-based rules. For a discussion of the differing approaches see
generally Sedler, supra note 14.
28. Although the courts purportedly follow different approaches, it is my
submission that on the whole they make the choice of law decision with reference to
the policies and interests of the involved states and considerations of fairness to the
parties. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 232-33.
29. This is what I refer to as judicial method and the policy-centered con-
flict of laws. See note 8, supra.
30. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 232-33.
31. See id.
32. Sedler, Rules of Choice-of-Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975 (1977).
33. See id. 1032.
34. Id. 1033.
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law is that when two parties from a recovery state, without
regard to forum residence, are involved in an accident in a
non-recovery state, recovery is allowed. 35 There are some other
situations in which the courts are divided; but these divisions
can be stated in terms of majority and minority views. For ex-
ample, the courts divide when two parties from a non-recovery
state are involved in an accident in a recovery state and suit is
brought in the recovery state. The majority view finds that the
forum should apply its own law allowing recovery.3 6 Similarly,
there have been a number of cases in which a recovery state
plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery state defendant in the
defendant's home state, and for one reason or another, suit
can be brought in the plaintiffs home state.3 7 Here the ma-
jority of courts have held that the forum should apply its own
law allowing recovery, assuming that this produces no un-
fairness to the defendant. 38
In making the choice of law decision then the courts have
emphasized the policies and interests of the involved states. In
order to assist courts in the process of deciding actual cases,
then, a reformulation of Currie's interest analysis methodology
was recently undertaken by this writer. 39 This reformulation
focuses on the real interests of the forum and of the other in-
volved state or states40 and establishes three interest situations
and solutions. First, when the forum has a real interest in ap-
plying its own law on the point in issue, 41 it should do so,
assuming that this will not be fundamentally unfair to the
other party.42 Second, when the forum does not have a real
interest in applying its law on the point in issue, but another
state has such an interest,4 it should apply the law of the
35. Id. 1034.
36. Id. 1035.
37. As to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the plaintiffs home
state in these circumstances, see id. 1037.
38. Id. 1036. When suit is brought in the defendant's home state, that state
will apply its own law, denying recovery. Id. 1037.
39. Sedler, supra note 14, at 220.
40. As to the meaning of real interests see id. 222-21. Most cases involve the
two state situation, but the analysis is equally applicable when a third state is in-
volved.
41. This covers what Currie calls the false conflict, when the forum is the
only interested state, and the true conflict, when the forum and another state both
have a real interest in applying their law on the point in issue.
42. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 221, 227.
43. This covers what Currie calls the false conflict when the forum is not the
state interested in applying its own law.
1978]
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other state, again assuming no fundamental unfairness. 44
Third, when neither state has a real interest in applying its
law on the point in issue, 45 the choice of law decision should
be made with reference to the common policies reflected in
the laws of the involved states. 46 These solutions are to a
substantial extent reflected in the tort rules of choice of law
discussed above.4 7 Experience has also demonstrated that or-
dinarily it is not difficult to identify the policies reflected in
the laws of the involved states and the interest of each state, in
light of those policies, in having its law applied on the point
in issue.48 Similarly, experience has shown that in practically
every accident situation no unfairness will result from the ap-
plication of the forum's own law or the law of the other in-
volved state.49 In short, in the years since Abendschein was
decided, it has become abundantly clear that a policy-
centered approach to choice of law does not produce a
"quagmire of unanswered and perceivably unanswerable ques-
tions."
To the contrary, if A bendschein were to arise today, a
court committed to a policy-centered approach could resolve it
fairly easily. Since the plaintiff alleged and apparently could
prove that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, there
was no conflict between the law of Michigan and the law of
New York on the issue of the guest passenger's right to recover
against the host driver. In the circumstances of that case,
then, both Michigan and New York had a policy of protecting
plaintiffs. Further, New York had a real interest in applying
its law to implement that policy, since the plaintiff was a resi-
dent of New York and the social and economic consequences
of the accident would be felt by the plaintiff in that state. On-
tario had a policy of protecting defendants and insurers, but it
had no interest in applying that policy in A bendschein, since
the defendant was a resident of Michigan, and the conse-
44. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 221-22.
45. This covers what Currie calls the unprovided for case.
46. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 235.
47. Courts may sometimes disagree over whether or not a state has a real in-
terest in applying its own law on the point in issue, such as whether the state where
an accident occurs has a real interest in applying its law allowing recovery in favor
of a non-resident injured there. This disagreement may be reflected in a majority
and minority view on the rule of choice of law. See Sedler, supra note 32, at 1032.
48. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 203.
49. See id. 227.
[Vol. 24
CHOICE OF LAW
quences of imposing liability would be felt by the defendant
and the insurer in that state. In terms of interest analysis,
then, A bendschein presented a false conflict, since only New
York had a real interest in applying its law on the point in
issue.
In addition, A bendschein clearly highlights the way in
which the rules of the traditional approach can produce irra-
tional and unsound-and what the court there referred to as
'"occasionally unjust"- results. The application of Ontario law
on the issue of guest-host immunity advanced no interest of
Ontario, while it defeated New York's real interest in applying
its law on that issue.50 Nor should the fact that plaintiff and
defendant were from different recovery states- have obscured
the point that a false conflict was presented. After all, the
identical situation was presented in a case decided prior to
A bendschein, Reich v. Purcell.5 1 The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals discussed Reich when Abendschein was before it,52 but,
interestingly, the Michigan supreme court did not. In Reich,
the victim was a resident of Ohio at the time of the fatal acci-
dent, which occurred in Missouri, and the defendant was a
resident of California.53 Only Missouri law limited the amount
recoverable. The California supreme court applied the law of
Ohio as the law of the only interested state. That same result,
the one reached by other courts presented with that same fact
pattern,54 is embodied in the rule of choice of law that when
two parties from a recovery state are involved in an accident
in a non-recovery state, recovery is allowed.5 5 It also illustrates
the second interest solution in the reformulation of Currie's in-
terest analysis: when the forum does not have a real interest in
applying its law on the point in issue, but another state has
such an interest, the forum should apply the law of the other
50. The application of the law of the place of injury under the traditional
approach frequently means that in the case of what Currie calls the false conflict
he law of the state which has no interest will be applied in preference to the law of
the only interested state. See B. CURRIE, supra note 22, at 163-64.
51. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
52. 11 Mich. App. 662, 674-75, 162 N.W.2d 165, 170-71, affd, 382 Mich.
510, 170 N.W.2d 39 (1969).
53. Ironically, the victim was on his way to California, and after the acci-
dent his beneficiaries settled there.
54. See Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 253 A.2d 129 (1970).
C Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976) (false con-
ict situation involving statute of limitations in wrongful death actions).
55. Sedler, supra note 32, at 1034.
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state. 6 Thus, the "occasionally unjust" results reached under
the traditional approach in this situation are avoided by courts
that adhere to the principles of the policy-centered approach.
Moreover, in a more complicated situation, the policy-
centered approach similarly facilitates sound decision-making.
For example, suppose that A bendschein were the more typical
guest-host immunity case in which only ordinary negligence
was alleged. Here Michigan would have a real interest in ap-
plying its law to deny recovery, since the consequences of im-
posing liability against the defendant and the insurer would be
felt in Michigan.57 New York would also have a real interest in
applying its law to allow recovery to the New York accident
victim. Thus, a true conflict would have been presented, as is
always the case when the plaintiff is from a recovery state and
the defendant is from a non-recovery state.18 Under the policy-
centered approach in these circumstances, regardless of
whether the accident had any factual contracts with Michigan,
Michigan should have applied its own law.59 Even in the
absence of any factual contacts with the transaction, it is well
settled that a state constitutionally may apply its own law
when it has a real interest in doing so and the application of
its law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party.60 Since
accidents are not planned, the application of a particular
state's law in an accident case would rarely result in such un-
fairness. 6' Again, an applicable rule of choice of law tailored
56. Sedler, supra note 14, at 221-27.
57. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 200 n.16. For insurance purposes, ac-
cidents are charged against the loss experience of the place where the vehicle is
garaged and registered irrespective of where the accident occurs. See generally Mor-
ris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process- The Insignificance of Foresight,
70 YALE L.J. 554, 567-69 (1961).
58. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 228. The interests of the parties' home
states are the same irrespective of where the accident occurred.
59. Judge Gillis, writing for the majority when Abendschein was before the
Court of Appeals, questioned whether Michigan constitutionally could apply its own
law because of its lack of factual contacts with the accident. 11 Mich. App. at 679,
162 N.W.2d at 173. Judge (now Justice) Levin, on the other hand, indicated that it
would not necessarily be improper to apply Michigan law, although he expressed
doubts that the Michigan guest statute was intended to apply to accidents occurring
in another state. 11 Mich. App. at 686-92, 162 N.W.2d at 177-80.
60. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the
Signficance of a State Line, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 394, 402-04 (1971).
61. In the accident situation, unfairness can result in two circumstances:
when a party could not have foreseen being held liable for the accident in question
and, therefore, could not have been expected to insure against such liability or
when the party may have conformed its conduct to the requirements of the law of a
particular state and, therefore, could not have expected that different requirements
would apply. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 229-30.
[Vol. 24
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to these circumstances has developed under a policy-centered,
approach: when a recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-
recovery state defendant, and suit is brought in the
defendant's home state, that state will apply its law, denying
recovery, irrespective of where the accident occurred. 62 This
rule of choice of law also illustrates the first interest solution
of the reformulation of Currie's interest analysis: when the
forum has a real interest in applying its own law on the point
in issue, it should do so, assuming that this will not be fun-
damentally unfair to the other party.
From the perspective of hindsight then, A bendschein was
not a difficult case; nor would it have been more difficult had
Michigan law denied recovery. The courts that have abandon-
ed the place of the wrong rule in favor of a policy-centered
approach have not been bogged down in a "quagmire of
unanswered and perceivably unanswerable questions." They
have reached fairly uniform results in the cases that have been
presented to them for decision, which can be incorporated in-
to rules of choice of law. There is much that Michigan can
learn from their experience.
III. THE EXPERIENCE IN MICHIGAN: THE PLACE OF THE
WRONG RULE AND "MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES"
When the Michigan supreme court in A bendschein opted
for the "admittedly hard and fast rule of the place of the
wrong, '63 it presumably hoped to obtain the advantages of
certainty, predictability and ease of application that the rules
of the traditional approach were designed to achieve. 64 If this
was its hope, the experience in Michigan in the years since
Abendschein was decided indicates that the court should be
greatly disappointed. The place of the wrong rule simply has
not been followed consistently by the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals and by the federal courts in Michigan called upon to ap-
ply Michigan conflicts law in diversity cases. These courts have
not hesitated to employ all of the classic "escape devices" and
62. See Sedler, supra note 32, at 1037.
63. 385 Mich. at 516, 170 N.W.2d at 139.
64. As has been noted: "Traditional choice-of-law thinking . . .rests upon
the assumption that choice-of-law rules, simple in form and capable of easy ad-
ministration, should promote uniformity of result, enhance predictability, and
discourage forum-shopping." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 20, at
13.
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"manipulative techniques" in order to avoid the operation of
the place of the wrong rule and to bring about the application
of Michigan law.6 5 In practice, the place of the wrong rule has
been honored more in the breach than in the observance. In
addition, there sometimes has been disagreement between par-
ticular panels of the court of appeals and between the court of
appeals and the federal courts Over the employment of
"manipulative techniques," so that it is not even possible to
predict whether the place of the wrong rule will be followed or
evaded. The decision in Adendschein, then, produced the
worst of both worlds; Michigan eschewed considerations of
policy and fairness and the advancement of its own real in-
terests in return for a choice of law that in practice is marked
by uncertainty and unpredictability.
As the court recognized in A bendschein, the application of
the "hard and fast rule of the place of the wrong" will pro-
duce an "occasionally unjust" result. 66 This indeed is an
understatement; when forum residents are involved in an acci-
dent in another state, the displacement of the forum's own law
and the sacrifice of its real interests is clearly an un-
sound-and in this sense "unjust" -result. Consequently, when
all courts followed the traditional approach to choice of law,
they frequently employed "manipulative techniques" precisely
in order to escape such a result. Although the courts pur-
portediy applied the rules of the traditional approach, they
would deliberately "manipulate" them in such a way as to ef-
fectuate the application of their own state's substantive law
and the implementation of the policy embodied in that law.
The "manipulative technique" was used only for the particular
case; when a similar case arose in which the court was not
willing to "manipulate the system," it would repudiate its
prior "departure" and return to the "correct" application of
the rules. 67
65. See generally Sedler, supra note 8, at 48-53.
66. 382 Mich. at 516, 170 N.W.2d at 139.
67. For example, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), the New York court of appeals held that
limitations on the amount recoverable for wrongful death went to the matter of
"remedy," so as to make it "procedure" for conflicts purposes and determined by
the law of the forum. This enabled it to apply New York law allowing unlimited
recovery for wrongful death in favor of the beneficiaries of a New York victim killed
in an airplane crash in Massachusetts, the law of which limited damages
recoverable for wrongful death to $15,000. The next year, however, when it was
contended that New York law, as the law of the forum, should determine entitle-
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Two of the most effective "manipulative techniques" were
those of "public policy" and "procedural characterization."
Under the traditional approach, the forum, on grounds of
"public policy," could refuse to enforce a claim existing under
the law of the state whose law governed when it found the
nature of the claim "shocking." This exception was to be used
very sparingly; it was to be a fairly rare circumstance where a
claim existing under the law of another state would be con-
sidered "shocking. ' 68  Furthermore, a dismissal on "public
policy" grounds presumably was not a dismissal on the merits
and the plaintiff was free to sue in another state whose statute
of limitations had not yet run. For this reason, "public policy"
could never be used to defeat a defense existing under the law
of the state whose substantive law the forum was applying,
since the effect of refusing to allow the defense would be to
render a judgment for the plaintiff. 69 Also, under the tradi-
tional approach, the law of the forum was to govern on all
matters of "procedure. '70 In order to bring about the effective
application of their own substantive law, however, courts
following the traditional approach could and frequently did
manipulate these principles. They would hold that it was
against their "public policy" to enforce a claim existing under
the law of the state whose law governed, even though that
claim was not "shocking" under the proper test of "public
policy," and similarly would apply "public policy" to defeat a
defense existing under the law of the state that they were ap-
plying, even though that enabled the plaintiff to prevail.7 1
They would also characterize the issue in question as "pro-
cedural," even though it was analytically "substantive," and
ment to pre-judgment interest, the court repudiated the "procedure" rationale of
Kilberg and held that the matter was one of "substance" for conflicts purposes.
Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
68. The "classic" test, as stated by Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918), was that enforcement of the
claim would have to "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."
69.
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of ac-
tion. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the
plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But
to refuse to give effect to a substantive defense under the applicable law of
another state . . . subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This
may not be done.
Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932) (Brandeis, J.). See also
Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938).
70. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 585 (1934).
71. See Sedler, supra note 8, at 51-52.
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had been so treated in all other cases by the forum and by
other courts. 72
Some "classic" examples of the use of these "manipulative
techniques" may be considered. For example, in Mertz v.
Mertz,73 New York spouses were involved in an accident in
Connecticut. Connecticut allowed intra-family suits; New York
did not. The New York court held that to allow the suit would
be against its "public policy." In Grant v. McAuliffe, 74 a
California plaintiff was injured in an accident in Arizona, in
which the driver of the other automobile, also a California
'resident, was killed. The tort cause of action survived the
death of the decedent under California law; it did not survive
under Arizona law. The California court held that survival of
actions was a matter of "procedure," to be determined by the
law of the forum, and allowed the suit. 75 In Kilberg v. North-
east Airlines,76  a New York resident was killed in an
airplane crash in Massachusetts. Massachusetts law limited the
amount of damages recoverable for wrongful death; New York
law did not. The New York court held that this involved a
matter of "procedure, ' 77 and disregarding the principle that
"public policy" cannot be used to defeat a defense existing
under the law of the state that governs, 78 it held that to
recognize the limitation would be against New York's "public
policy." In all of these cases, the forum had a real interest in
applying its own law and clearly would have done so under a
policy-centered approach to choice of law. But confronted
with the necessity of adhering to the place of the wrong rule,
they deliberately "manipulated the system" to bring about
what they considered to be a sound and just result. 79
72. Id. 50-51.
73. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
74. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
75. That the court was employing "manipulative techniques" was subse-
quently acknowledged and justified by Justice Traynor, the writer of the opinion.
As he stated:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion is my own, I do not
regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be against the
brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would make no more
apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less deft than it
might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of choice of law.
Traynor, Is This Conjlct Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
76. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). See note 67
supra.77. The court repudiated this finding the following year. See note 67 supra.
78. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
79. See Sedier, supra note 8, at 50-53.
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The Michigan Court of Appeals and the federal courts in
Michigan, bound by the strictures of A bendschein, similarly
have resorted to these "manipulative techniques" in order to
bring about the application of Michigan law. In addition,
they have tinkered with the Michigan borrowing statute in
order to allow suit in Michigan by a Michigan plaintiff that
was time-barred under the law of the state where the accident
occurred. In Branyan v. Alpena Flying Service,80 Michigan
residents"' flying in a chartered airplane owned and operated
by a Michigan corporation, were killed when the airplane
crashed in Virginia. Virginia law limited the amount of
damages recoverable for wrongful death; Michigan law did
not. The Michigan Court of Appeals, noting that the
Michigan supreme court in A bendschein had excluded
airplane accidents from the operation of the place of the
wrong rule,8 2 concluded that it would be against Michigan's
"public policy" to limit the amount of damages recoverable
for wrongful death.8 3 It then proceeded to employ interest
analysis, which in this case of false conflict led to the applica-
tion of Michigan law. In Tucker v. Norfolk and Western
Railway Co.,8 4 two Michigan spouses were involved in an acci-
dent in Ohio. Michigan allowed intra-family suits; Ohio did
not. Suit was brought in a federal district court in Michigan.
Here the court had the advantage of a previous Michigan
supreme court decision, Kircher v. Kircher,5 which like the
New York decision in Mertz v. Mertz,8 6 had employed "public
policy" to bar an intra-family suit between Michigan spouses
at a time when Michigan recognized intra-family immunity.
The district court, distinguishing A bendschein on the ground
that the Michigan supreme court in that case found that no
question of intra-family immunity was involved, concluded
that the Kircher public policy analysis rather than the A bend-
80. 65 Mich. App. 1, 236 N.W.2d 739 (1975).
81. Three of the four victims were Michigan residents.
82. 65 Mich. App. at 5, 236 N.W.2d at 742. In Abendschein the court said:
"Bearing in constant mind that this case and its issue deals only with actions at law
for damages arising out of motorcar (not airplane) accidents, and that no intra-
family litigation is involved ...... 382 Mich. at 519, 170 N.W.2d at 140.
83. It equated "public policy" with "substantive law" in the same manner as
the New York court of appeals did in Mertz and Kilberg. This, of course, is not
the meaning of "public policy" for conflicts purposes.
84. 403 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
85. 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939).
86. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). See text at note 73 supra.
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schein place of the wrong holding controlled the principle
case. 87 Thus, since it was now against Michigan's "public
policy" to refuse to allow a tort action between Michigan
spouses, the claim against the defendant-spouse was permit-
ted. The court, however, conveniently ignored the fact that it
was rejecting a defense, as opposed to a claim, existing under
the governing law, which was clearly improper under the prin-
ciples of the traditional approach. As in Branyan, the court
applied Michigan law in this case of false conflict. Its "good
work" in this regard, however, was undone by the decision of
the Michigan Court of Appeals in Sweeney v. Sweeney, 88
where a panel different than that which sat in Branyan
distinguished Branyan on the ground that it presented no
question as to the "existence of the cause of action, ' 89 but only
one as to the amount of damages recoverable. It also
characterized the reference to intra-family immunity in
Abendschein as "dicta," not justifying any departure from the
place of the wrong rule in cases involving intra-family im-
munity. 90 It thus applied Ohio law to bar a suit between
Michigan spouses. What really happened, of course, was that
the judges who decided Sweeney were not willing to employ
"manipulative techniques" to bring about the application of
Michigan law, while the judges who decided Branyan and
Tucker were. In Papizzo v. 0. Robertson Transport, Ltd., 91 a
Michigan victim was killed in Ontario due to the negligence of
an Ontario defendant. Under Michigan law recovery was
allowed in a wrongful death action for various intangible in-
terests, such as loss of companionship; under Onatrio law it
was not. Suit was brought in a federal court in Michigan. The
court held that the elements of damages recoverable went to
"procedure," to be determined by Michigan law as the law of
the forum. 92 In so doing, it emphasized Michigan's interest in
applying its law allowing greater recovery and the absence of
87. 403 F. Supp. at 1373. As to the quoted language from Abendschein, see
note 82 supra.
88. 71 Mich. App. 428, 248 N.W.2d 571 (1976), appeal granted, 399 Mich.
896 (1977).
89. Id. at 430, 248 N.W.2d at 572.
90. Id. at 429-30, 248 N.W.2d at 572.
91. 401 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
92. It cited Kilberg in support of this conclusion, notwithstanding that this
basis of Kilberg had been repudiated by the New York court of appeals the year
after it was decided. See note 67 supra.
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unfairness to the defendant in the application of Michigan law
on this issue.93
In addition to devising "manipulative techniques," the
Michigan Court of Appeals has been willing in some cases to
use the Michigan borrowing statute in order to circumvent the
time-barring effect of the law of the state where the injury oc-
curred. In Parish v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,9 4 the Michigan
supreme court had occasion to interpret the Michigan borrow-
ing statute, 95 which provides that a suit not barred by limita-
tions under Michigan law may nevertheless be barred by the
law of the "place where the claim accrued." In other words,
the shorter statute of limitations of that state applies. Assum-
ing that the term, "place where the claim accrued," is
synonymous with "state whose substantive law the court is ap-
plying, ' 96 so long as Michigan adheres to the place of the
wrong rule, the "place where the claim accrued" within the
meaning of the borrowing statute in accident cases is the state
where the accident occurred. In Parish the court so held, and
applied the shorter Ohio statute of limitations to bar the claim
of Michigan plaintiffs who purchased a defective tire in
Michigan that blew out in Ohio, causing an accident there. 97
Likewise, in Long v. Pettinato,9 8 the Michigan supreme court
held that the borrowing statute applied to accidents occurring
in foreign countries, such as Canada, and applied the Ontario
statute of limitations to bar a suit arising from an accident in-
volving Michigan parties that occurred on the Canadian side
93. 401 F. Supp. at 543.
94. 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975).
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5861(2) (1968).
96. Some courts have interpreted these statutes literally without regard to
whether the place "where the claim accrued" is also the state whose substantive law
the court would be applying. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse
Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 18 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930
(1967). If the forum is applying the traditional approach to choice of law, the place
"where the claim accrued" will be the state whose substantive law it is applying,
since it is applying the law of the state where the "last act" necessary to the ex-
istence of liability occurred. If it has abandoned the traditional approach, however,
this will not necessarily be so. Since the purpose of the borrowing statute is to bar
suit at the forum if it is time-barred in the state whose substantive law the forum is
applying, the place "where the claim accrued," should be interpreted to mean the
state whose substantive law the forum is applying. See Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v.
Fairchild-Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890, 894 (N.D. Ill. 1971), criticized on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603, 607 n.8 (1975).
97. It also held that the plaintiff could not avoid the bar of the borrowing
statute by proceeding on a breach of warranty theory. 395 Mich. at 277, 235
N.W.2d at 572.
98. 394 Mich. 545, 230 N.W.2d 550 (1975).
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of the Ambassador Bridge. Similarly, in cases such as Pus-
quilian v. Cedar Point, Inc., 99 and Shamie v. Shamie, 100
the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the shorter statute to
bar the claim of a Michigan plaintiff that was not time-barred
under Michigan law. However, in De Vito v. Blenc,' 0' where
Michigan parties were involved in an accident in Ontario, the
court grafted the tolling provisions of the Michigan statute of
limitations onto the Ontario statute of limitations to hold that
the Ontario statute had not run. This was a clear departure
from the approach normally taken to tolling provisions; usual-
ly the forum's tolling provisions apply only to the forum's
statute of limitations and the other state's tolling provisions
apply to its statute. 0 2 The effect in De Vito was to allow a suit
that would have been barred if brought in Ontario, a result
clearly inconsistent with the express language of the borrowing
statute. 0 3 In Wilson v. Eubanks,10 4 where, again, Michigan
parties were involved in an accident in Ontario and suit was
barred by the Ontario statute of limitations, the court refused
to allow the defendant to amend his answer to plead this
defense. Its hostility toward applying Ontario law to bar the
suit was reflected in its observation that "one who asserts the
defense of a foreign statute of limitations to bar an action bet-
ween residents of Michigan timely brought under Michigan
law must cut square corners."' 05
In the ten cases involving conflicts torts questions that have
arisen since Abendschein, then, four directly involving choice
of law (Branyan, Tucker, Sweeney, and Papizzo), and six in-
volving choice of law indirectly in the sense that the choice of
law decision was subsumed in the decision with respect to the
borrowing statute (Pusquilian, Shamie, De Vito, Parish, Long,
and Wilson), a policy-centered approach to choice of law
would have called for the application of Michigan law. In all
of these cases Michigan had a real interest in applying its law
on the point in issue, since the plaintiff was a resident of
99. 41 Mich. App. 399, 200 N.W.2d 489 (1972).
100. 45 Mich. App. 384, 206 N.W.2d 463 (1973).
101. 47 Mich. App. 524, 209 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Conner v. Spencer, 304 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1962); Bowling v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 431 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1968).
103. The statute provides: "The period of limitation applicable to a claim ac-
cruing outside of this state shall be either that prescribed by the law of the place
where the claim accrued or by the law of this state, whichever bars the claim."
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5861(2) (1968) (emphasis added).
104. 36 Mich. App. 287, 193 N.W.2d 353 (1971).
105. 36 Mich. App. at 293, 193 N.W.2d at 356.
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Michigan, and in all but two cases (Parish and Pasquilian),
the defendant was as well, and since the social and economic
consequences of the accident would be felt in Michigan. Alho,
in all of these cases, as in the accident situation generally, the
application of Michigan law would not have been fundamen-
tally unfair to the other party. Moreover, the consistent ap-
plication of the place of the wrong rule would have resulted in
the displacement of Michigan law and the sacrifice of its real
interests. Indeed, in eight of the ten cases, where both the
plaintiff and the defendant were Michigan residents, the state
of injury had no interest at all in applying its law to deny
recovery, so that, as in A bendschein, the place of the wrong
rule operated to defeat the interest of the only concerned state
without advancing any interest of the state whose law was ap-
plied.
If adherence to the place of the wrong rule really did
achieve "certainty, predictability and ease of application," it
would do so at a terrible price: the sacrifice of Michigan's real
interests in case after case involving Michigan parties simply
because the accident occurred in another state.10 6 In no sense
have those objectives even remotely been achieved. Adherence
to the place of the wrong rule has merely forced the Michigan
Court of Appeals and the federal courts in Michigan-when
they are disposed to do so-to resort to "manipulative tech-
niques" and questionable interpretations of the borrowing
statute. Choice of law in Michigan is in a shambles. It is im-
possible to predict when the Michigan Court of Appeals or the
federal courts in Michigan will again decide to resort to
"manipulative techniques," or when one panel of the court of
appeals will refuse to follow the lead of another panel or of
the federal courts in employing them. A bendschein truly has
produced the worst of both worlds in Michigan. The results in
conflicts torts cases are neither sound nor predictable. It is all
one big mess.
IV. A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW: CHOICE OF LAW IN MICHIGAN
UNDER A POLICY-CENTERED APPROACH
The choice of law shambles that now exists in Michigan is
all the more tragic, since the conflicts torts cases that actually
106. See the discussion concerning the sacrifice of the forum's real interests
by the application of the rules of the traditional approach in B. CURRIE, supra note
22, at 100-01.
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have arisen here and that are likely to arise in the future can
be disposed of without much difficulty under a policy-centered
approach. Conflicts torts cases tend to fall into certain fact-
law patterns.1 0 7 The analysis of the policies and interests of the
involved states in the particular case can be related to the
fact-law pattern presented there, and the decision can be ap-
plied directly or analogously to another case presenting the
same or a similar fact-law pattern. In torts cases the fact part
of the fact-law pattern relates to the states where the parties
reside, the state where the harm occurred, and if its differs,
the state where the act or omission causing the harm took
place. The law part primarily relates to whether the law in
question allows or denies recovery.108 Thus, a case may present
the fact-law pattern of (1) two parties from a recovery state in-
volved in an accident in a non-recovery state, (2) two parties
from a non-recovery state involved in an accident in a
recovery state, and (3) parties from different states, one of
which allows recovery and the other of which does not, involv-
ed in an accident in one or the other state. It is from these
fact-law patterns that rules of choice of law emerge in con-
flicts torts cases. 10 9
As discussed previously," 0 these rules of choice of law are
based on the policies reflected in the laws of the involved
states, and the interest of each state, in light of those policies,
in having its law applied on the point in issue. In addition,
whenever the forum recognizes a real interest in applying its
own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law, it is likely to do so, assuming that this will not be fun-
107. See Sedler, supra note 32, at 980. It is possible to construct fact-law pat-
terns in conflicts contracts cases as well. Id. 980, n.27. In conflicts contracts cases
Michigan presumably follows the "place of making" rule, with the qualification that
the law of the state where the contract was made does not apply if the contract was
intended to be performed in another state. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp.
v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
See also Waldorf v. KMS Industries, 25 Mich. App. 20, 181 N.W.2d 85 (1970).
Decisions in conflicts contracts cases likewise can be made on the basis of considera-
tions of policy and fairness to the parties. Courts in practice have had no difficulty
applying a policy-centered approach to conflicts contracts cases. See Sedler, The
Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72
COL. L. REv. 279, 302-15 (1972).
108. It also relates to whether the law in question reflects an admonitory or a
compensatory policy or both, and whether it involves other considerations, such as
those applicable to workmen's compensation.
109. Sedler, supra note 32, at 981.
110. See notes 27-47 & accompanying text supra.
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damentally unfair to the other party."l ' Three rules of choice
of law in the torts area that embody two of the interest solu-
tions proposed under my reformulation of Currie's interest
analysis methodology" 2 cover Abendschein and all of the post-
Abendschein cases that have arisen in Michigan.
The most "universal" rule of choice of law is that when
two residents of the forum are involved in an accident in
another state, the forum will apply its own law. This rule of
choice of law embodies the interest solution that when the
forum has a real interest in applying its own law, it should do
So. The application of this rule of choice of law in Michigan
would cover Branyan, Tucker, Sweeney, Papizzo, Shamie,
De Vito and Wilson. Another rule of choice of law is that
when two parties from a recovery state, without regard to
forum residence, are involved in an accident in a non-recovery
state, recovery will be allowed."14 This rule embodies the in-
terest solution that when the forum does not have a real in-
terest in applying its own law, but another state does have
such an interest, it should apply the law of the other state. As
pointed out previously," 5 this rule of choice of law covers
A bendschein, since in the circumstances presented, both New
York, the plaintiff's home state, and Michigan, the
defendant's home state, would allow recovery, while Ontario,
where the accident occurred, would not.
Only Parish and Pusquilian remain. In both of these cases
the plaintiff was a Michigan resident, the defendant was a
non-resident, .and the accident occurred in another state. In
Parish, the defendant was doing substantial business in
Michigan and the product that caused the injury was purchas-
ed there. In Pusquilian the defendant advertised extensively in
Michigan and drew a large number of its patrons from that
state."16 Both of these cases involved choice of law only in-
directly in that the precise question before the court concern-
111. See Sedler, supra note 14, at 233.
112. Id. 215.
113. See Sedler, supra note 32, at 1033.
114. Id. 1034.
115. See notes 50-56 & accompanying text supra.
116. The defendant's extensive advertising and solicitation of business in
Michigan would provide sufficient "minimum contacts" for the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction in Michigan over the claim of a Michigan resident arising from
an accident at the defendant's amusement park in Ohio. The court's dismissal of
the case on grounds of limitations made it unnecessary for it to consider the defen-
dant's lack of jurisdiction contention.
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ed the applicability of the state of injury's shorter statute of
limitations to bar the suit. These cases can be reframed,
however, to involve the choice of law question directly. Sup-
pose that in these cases the defendant asserts the defense of
contributory negligence, which is a complete bar under the
law of the defendant's home state, where the injury occurred.
Assume, on the other hand, that Michigan recognizes com-
parative negligence. 117 Michigan has a real interest in applying
its law to allow recovery, since the social and economic conse-
quences of the accident will be felt by the plaintiff in that
state. The defendant's home state likewise has a real interest
in applying its law in order to protect its resident defendant
and insurer. In a situation such as this Michigan should ad-
vance its own real interests and apply its own law. No un-
fairness results, since accidents are not planned and since con-
tributory negligence is not the kind of matter that involves any
reliance on the law of a particular state."n The application of
Michigan law under these circumstances is also called for by
the interest solution that the forum should apply its own law
whenever it has a real interest in doing so. This interest solu-
don is reflected in the rule of choice of law followed by most
of the courts that have passed on the question: when a
recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery state
defendant in the defendant's home state, and suit is brought
in the plaintiffs home state, recovery is allowed. 119
There are other fact-law patterns that may arise in
Michigan. The courts, though, can find guidance for their
resolution in these interest solutions and in the rules of choice
of law that have been developed by other courts in the process
of deciding actual cases. The policy-centered approach to
choice of law does not produce a "quagmire of unanswered
and perceivably unanswerable questions" - the fear of the
Michigan supreme court in A bendschein. It requires only a
realistic assessment of the policies and interests of the involved
states and considerations of fairness to the parties. 20 The clear
majority of courts in this country which adopted the policy-
117. See Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977).
118. -As compared with, for example, the standard of care owed a visitor on
the land. See Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
119. See Sedler, supra note 32, at 1036.
120. As pointed out previously, fairness to the parties usually is not a prob-
lem in accident cases. See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
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centered approach in the wake of their abandonment of the
traditional approach have applied it effectively. It certainly
can be applied effectively in Michigan as well. Its adoption
would lead to sound and just results in the cases that come
before the courts for decision and would extricate choice of
law in Michigan from the shambles that now exists.
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY
In light of the decision of the Michigan supreme court in
Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan,'21 invalidating the
Michigan guest statute as violative of the equal protection
clause of the Michigan Constitution, 122 continued adherence to
the place of the wrong rule raises a serious constitutional ques-
tion insofar as it results in the application of the law of the
place of injury to deny recovery to a Michigan plaintiff in-
jured by a Michigan defendant in another state. 123
Currie contended that the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause imposed limitations on a state's power to
make choice of law decisions, designed to prevent
unreasonable discrimination against forum residents or
residents of other states.'2 4 In his view the forum would be
discriminating unreasonably against its own residents by deny-
ing them the benefit of its own law solely on the ground that
the case was connected with another state, such as when,
following the place of the wrong rule, it would apply the law
of the state of injury to deny recovery to a forum plaintiff in-
jured by a forum defendant in another state. Since the forum
would apply its own law in a purely domestic case, and since
its interest in applying that law was the same when the acci-
dent occurred in another state, Currie maintained that the
distinction between the application of the fourm's law in favor
of forum residents depending on where the accident occurred
was unreasonable and violative of equal protection. 25 As
121. 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975).
122. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
123. This is the situation that was presented in eight out of the ten post-
A bendschein cases.
124. See generally B. CURIE, supra note 22, at 572-83. His views in this
regard were originally set forth in an article co-authored by Professor Herma Hill
Kay, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28
U. CHI L. REv. 1 (1960).
125. B. CURIE, supra note 22, at 572-83.
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discussed fully elsewhere, 26 however, to the extent the United
States Supreme Court has been unwilling to find significant
limitations on choice of law inhering in the due process and
full faith and credit clauses, and, in fact, has not granted
review in any case involving a constitutional challenge to
choice of law in over a decade, 27 it is unlikely to find such
limitations inhering in the equal protection clause or in other
clauses of the Constitution either. Thus, it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would hold that it is violative of equal protec-
tion for a state court to continue to apply the place of the
wrong rule, even if this results in discrimination against a
forum resident solely because the accident occurred in another
state. 28
In Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, the Michigan
supreme court, however, made it clear that the equal protection
clause of the Michigan Constitution limits severely the power of
the state to distinguish between identifiable classes of accident
victims. Such a distinction is present, however, whenever the
place of the wrong rule is applied to deny recovery under
Michigan law to a Michigan plaintiff injured by a Michigan
defendant in another state, since if the accident occurred in
Michigan, Michigan law, allowing recovery, would apply.
Moreover, the "certainty, predictability and ease of applica-
tion" justification that the court advanced for the retention of
the place of the wrong rule in A bendschein cannot withstand
the "substantial relation to the object" standard that it pro-
mulgated for equal protection purposes in Mainstee. To the
contrary, as we have seen, the application-or more accurate-
ly, misapplication-of the place of the wrong rule has made a
shambles out of choice of law in Michigan. Even if the place
of the wrong rule were being consistently applied, there would
still be no reasonable basis for distinguishing between
Michigan accident victims injured by the negligence of
Michigan defendants in Michigan and in other states. In both of
these instances the social and economic consequences of the
126. Sedler, Interstate Acqidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV. 125, 144-45 (1973).
127. The last time the Supreme Court considered a question of the constitu-
tionality of a state court's choice of law decision was in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
128. As a practical matter, it in all likelihood would refuse to grant review to
consider the question.
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accident are felt in Michigan, and in both of these instances
Michigan law allows recovery; so long as Michigan continues
to follow the place of the wrong rule, however, the right to
recover under Michigan law depends on whether or not the
accident occurred in Michigan. Since the place where the ac-
cident occurs bears no "substantial relation to the object" of
Michigan's policy in allowing recovery to accident victims, the
rationale of Manistee would indicate that the distinction bet-
ween Michigan residents injured by Michigan residents in
Michigan and those injured by Michigan residents in other
states is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Michigan Constitution.
If this analysis is correct, it follows that in a case involving
Michigan parties, the lower courts are free to declare the ap-
plication of the place of the wrong rule violative of the
Michigan Constitution and to decide the case under Michigan
law. More significantly perhaps, the possible unconstitutionali-
ty of continued adherence to the place of the wrong rule in its
most frequent application in practice 129 should prompt the
Michigan supreme court to resolve the question at the earliest
opportunity.
VI. CONCLUSION: A TIME To CAST AWAY
In the years since A bendschein was decided, the clear ma-
jority of American state courts have abandoned the traditional
approach to choice of law and have adopted a policy-centered
approach in its stead. They have reached sound and just
results in the cases coming before them by making choice of
law decisions on the basis of considerations of policy and
fairness to the parties. Their experience contrasts sharply with
that of Michigan, where choice of law is in a shambles. It is
now the season for change. It is time for Michigan to go
modern. It is time for Michigan to adopt the policy-centered
conflict of laws.
Addendum
After this article was completed and going through the
process of publication, two cases were decided, one by the
Michigan supreme court, and one by the Michigan Court of
129. Eight of the ten post-A bendschein cases have involved a Michigan plaintiff
injured by a Michigan defendant in another state.
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Appeals, in which review has been granted by the Michigan
supreme court, which may portend change in the future.
In Sweeney v. Sweeney,'30 the Michigan supreme court,
while refusing to abandon the place of the wrong rule, refused
to reaffirm it either, and held that Michigan's "public policy"
dicated that Michigan law apply on the issue of spousal im-
munity in an Ohio accident involving Michigan parties.
Noting that Sweeney "provides an opportunity to reappraise
our entire conflicts of law policy,"' 3' the court also noted that
there were "recognized perils in an overbroad approach,"' 13
and concluded that, "We can reach a proper result in this
case without revamping Michigan's entire law of conflicts."'' 33
It cited both Kircher v. Kircher, 134 and Tucker v. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co.,' 35 for the proposition that to apply
Ohio law to deny recovery here would be against Michigan's
"public policy,"13 6 but seemingly took pains to make it clear
that it was not using "public policy" as a "manipulative
technique."' 3 7 It stated:
The state of residence has a substantial interest in the
parent-child legal relationship. Michigan's announced public
policy is to permit a child "to maintain a lawsuit against his
parent for injuries suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary
negligence of the parent." That public policy should apply
to Michigan residents suing in Michigan courts even though
the alleged negligence occurred in Ohio.
Automatic application of the lex loci delicti in this
daughter against father suit would frustrate an announced
Michigan public policy. Whether the lex loci delicti should
be applied in other situations is not decided here.1 38
The frank acknowledgement of Michigan's real interest in ap-
plying its law here makes it clear that the court was not saying
that it would be against Michigan's "public policy" to allow
assertation of a claim of spousal immunity. Rather, it was say-
ing that Michigan would apply its own law on that issue
whenever Michigan parties were involved in an accident in a
130. 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978).
131. Id. at 239, 262 N.W.2d at 627.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 288 Mich. 669, 289 N.W. 120 (1939).
135. 403 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
136. 402 Mich. at 242, 262 N.W.2d at 638.
137. In my view, this is what was done in Tucker. See note 84 & accompany-
ing text supra.
138. 402 Mich. at 242, 262 N.W.2d at 628.
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spousal immunity state, because the policy reflected in
Michigan's law would be advanced by such application.
As Brainerd Currie observed some years ago, "[w]hy not
summon public policy from the reserves and place it in the
front line where it belongs?"13 9 Michigan's policy of allowing
recovery to a child injured by the negligence of the parent is
no different than Michigan's constitutionally-mandated policy
of allowing a guest passenger to recover against a host driver
for ordinary negligence or of allowing the beneficiaries of an
accident victim to recover unlimited damages for wrongful
death. Its policy with respect to recovery in tort cases is
strongly implicated whenever both parties are Michigan
residents as in Sweeney, and in the eight of the ten recent
cases discussed in this article. That policy would be served by
holding that Michigan law applies whenever Michigan parties
are involved in an accident in another state. This rule of
choice of law, which is followed by all of the states that have
abandoned the traditional approach, 140 is all that the court
need have adopted in Sweeney, and in accordance with
judicial method and the common law tradition, it can decide
cases presenting different fact-law patterns when and if those
cases arise. It did not have to "revamp Michigan's entire law
of conflicts" in Sweeney, but it could have rendered a holding
that went beyond Michigan's "public policy" as to spousal im-
munity.
It will have another opportunity to do so when it decides
Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Cos.,141 In that case
wrongful death actions were brought by the beneficiaries of
Michigan residents who were drowned when the newly-
purchased boat in which they were sailing sank in the waters
of Lake Erie. The boat was purchased in Michigan, where the
manfacturer did substantial business. 42 The suit was timely
filed under Michigan law. It was conceded that the deaths
could not have occurred in Michigan waters, and that they oc-
curred in either Ohio or Ontario waters. Applying the
139. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 88 (1963).
140. See the discussion in Sedler, Rules of Choices-of-Law Versus Choice-of-
Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975,
1033-34 (1977).
141. 80 Mich. App. 55, 263 N.W.2d 282 (1977), review granted May 3,
1978.
142. And so for these purposes the manufacturer should be considered a
Michigan defendant. See Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1971).
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Michigan borrowing statute and looking to Ohio and Ontario
law to determine when their respective limitation periods
started to run, 143 the court found that suit was barred by both
the Ohio and Ontario statutes.
The plaintiffs argued that the application of the borrowing
statute was violative of equal protection, because it
discriminated between Michigan residents injured in Michigan
and Michigan residents injured outside the state where the
limitation periods frequently were shorter than those of
Michigan. The court, without referring at all to Manistee
Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan,144 found that the borrowing
statute was constitutional because it "resolves many conflicts of
laws questions," and thus concluded that, "It thus appears not
only that the purpose of the statute is reasonable, but that
there is a reasonable relation between its purpose and the un-
equal classes which it creates."'1 45 But Manistee requires that
there be a "substantial relation" to the object, and it is dif-
ficult to see how the policy of the borrowing statute is
"substantially advanced" by barring suits between Michigan
parties, timely filed under Michigan law, on the sole ground
that the accident occurred in another state.
Szlinis again points up the unsoundness of failing to apply
Michigan law when Michigan parties are involved in an acci-
dent elsewhere-whether in the Ontario or Ohio waters of
Lake Erie, or on the Canadian side of the Ambassador
Bridge, or simply on a highway in Ohio. The social and
economic consequences of the accident will be felt in
Michigan in the same manner as if the accident occurred in
Michigan, and it now may be time for the Michigan supreme
court to face up to that reality. The fears about a "quagmire
of unanswered and possibility unanswerable questions"'146 and
"recognized perils in an overbroad approach,"'147 should be
answered by the experience of the other courts that have
abandoned the traditional approach in favor of a policy-
centered conflict of law. It may be that the court will come to
realize this when it decides Szlinis.
143. Cf. DeVito v. Blenc, 47 Mich. App. 524, 209 N.W.2d 728 (1973), where
the same court grafted the tolling provisions of the Michigan statute of limitations
onto the Ontario statute of limitations to hold that the Ontario statute had not run.
144. 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975).
145. 80 Mich. App. at 67, 263 N.W.2d at 288.
146. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 516, 170 N.W.2d 137, 139
(1969).
147. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 239, 262 N.W.2d 625, 627 (1978).
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